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Technological management and the Rule of Law 
Roger Brownsword* 
 
1. Introduction 
In a number of papers, I have proposed that lawyers should take an interest in the use of 
‘technological management’; I have suggested that the idea of the ‘regulatory environment’, 
comprising both a normative (rule-based) and non-normative (technologically managed) 
dimension, will serve to frame juristic inquiries related to this phenomenon; and, I have 
emphasised the urgency of opening such inquiries so that, in particular, we can more clearly 
understand how the ideals of the Rule of Law and of legality might be applied to a regulatory 
strategy that relies, not on rules, but on technological applications in order to channel and 
steer human conduct.1  The purpose of this paper is to present my first sketch of how these 
ideals should be applied.2  
In order to develop this sketch, this paper responds to four questions that we might ask about 
the implications of technological management relative to the values that we associate with the 
 
*  I tried out some of the ideas in this paper at a workshop on ‘Ethical Rationalism and the Law’ at the 
University of Durham (October 15-16, 2015), in giving the Knut Selmer Memorial Lecture 2015 at the 
University of Oslo (November 4, 2015), and in my Mason Institute Winter Lecture at the University of 
Edinburgh (January 14, 2016). I am grateful for the many questions and comments received following 
those presentations. I am also extremely grateful to Mireille Hildebrandt and to Bert-Jaap Koops, each 
of whom read and then returned detailed and invaluable comments on a draft version of the paper, and 
to William Lucy for help with the Rule of Law. Needless to say, the usual disclaimers apply. 
 
1  Roger Brownsword, ‘Lost in Translation: Legality, Regulatory Margins, and Technological 
Management’ (2011) 26 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 132; ‘Comparatively Speaking: “Law in its 
Regulatory Environment”’ in Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut (eds), The Method and Culture of 
Comparative Law (Festschrift for Mark van Hoecke) (Oxford: Hart, 2014) 189; ‘In the Year 2061: 
From Law to Technological Management’ (2015) 7 Law, Innovation and Technology 1; ‘Field, Frame 
and Focus: Methodological Issues in the New Legal World’ in Rob van Gestel, Hans Micklitz, and Ed 
Rubin (eds), Rethinking Legal Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); and, ‘Law 
as a Moral Judgment, the Domain of Jurisprudence, and Technological Management’ in Patrick Capps 
and Shaun D. Pattinson (eds), Ethical Rationalism and the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2016). 
2  Any discussion of the central issues in this paper invites the question of how we are to understand the 
concept of law, together with the associated concepts of legality and the Rule of Law. For an opening 
of such questions (albeit in another context), see, Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘Radbruch’s Rechtstaat and 
Schmitt’s Legal Order: Legalism, Legality, and the Institution of Law’ (2015) 2:1 Critical Analysis of 
Law 42, available at http://cal.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/cal/article/view/22514/18311 (accessed 
February 8, 2016).  My own legal idealist understanding goes back more than three decades to Deryck 
Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, ‘Law as a Moral Judgment versus Law as the Rules of the 
Powerful’ (1983) 28 American Journal of Jurisprudence 79; and Law as a Moral Judgment (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1986; reprinted, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994). Accordingly, against 
legal positivists, my reading of Fuller’s principles of legality is, indeed, as an inner morality of law; 
and my reading of the Rule of Law derives from the discussion of constitutionality in Law as a Moral 
Judgment. However, in this paper, I have generally distanced the discussion from the substantive 
(Gewirthian) principles that lie at the core of my legal idealism—whether, and precisely how, 
Gewirthian substantive principles might distinctively constrain the use of technological management is 
a question for another paper. See, further, Parts 3 and 6. 
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Rule of Law. There might well be other questions to be asked but these four, and especially 
(in this paper) the third of the questions, strike me as ones that we might usefully address. 
The questions are as follows. First, because technologically managed environments are 
designed to guarantee that the regulatory purposes are achieved, they are the perfect example 
of instrumentalist reasoning. If, as some (including myself) might think, pure instrumentalism 
(in the sense of treating persons as mere objects) is incompatible with the Rule of Law, does 
it follow that technological management is necessarily in tension with the values and virtues 
of the Rule of Law? Secondly, where the Rule of Law is observed, the existing rule 
framework provides the initial reference point for judging whether there has been an abuse of 
power. Is technological management susceptible to the same kind of judgment? Thirdly, 
because the standard Fullerian concept of legality presupposes that we are dealing with an 
enterprise of rules,3 can the principles of legality be applied to the quite different strategy of 
technological management? Indeed, we might wonder whether there is any point in trying to 
assess the applicability of rule-related legality to technologically-achieved management. 
Fourthly, given that technological management is designed to exclude certain options and to 
compel certain acts, and given that this has implications for the possibility of acting freely in 
line with one’s moral judgments, are there some uses of technological management that the 
Rule of Law should place off limits? Or, to put this another way, even if a rule that prohibits 
the doing of x would satisfy the Rule of Law, are there additional requirements before the use 
of technological management (rather than rules) to exclude the possibility of doing x will also 
satisfy the Rule of Law?  
The paper is in six principal parts. In the first two parts, I speak to a couple of preliminary 
matters: first (in Part 2), with regard to the concept of technological management, I speak to 
the way in which an implicit normative position might be read into what presents as a non-
normative regulatory instrument; and, then (in Part 3), I say a few words about the heavily 
contested concept of the Rule of Law. I then address each of the four organising questions. 
Part 4 focuses on the concern about instrumentalism; Part 5 considers how it might be 
claimed that technological management involves an abuse of power; Part 6 revisits the 
Fullerian principles of legality in a context of technological management; and Part 7 sets out 
some limits that a community with moral aspirations might wish to place on the use of 
technological management.  
2. The concept of technological management: linking the normative to the non-
normative 
In my previous papers, I have been at pains to contrast traditional (normative) rule-based 
regulatory instruments with (non-normative) measures of technological management: 
whereas the former speak the language of ‘oughts’, signalling to regulatees which acts are 
prohibited, permitted, or required, the latter speak the language of ‘can’ and ‘cannot’, 
signalling to regulatees which acts are possible and which impossible. For the purposes of 
understanding and assessing the changing complexion of the regulatory environment, this 
 
3  See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).   
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contrast is crucial. However, for present purposes, the point that I wish to draw out is the 
importance of recognising the continuing link between the regulators’ normative intentions 
and the translation of these intentions into a technologically managed environment.4 
The clearest example of this link is where there is already a rule that prohibits x (such as 
taking golf carts off course and using them for joy-riding, or wheeling supermarket trolleys 
off site and abandoning them) but, because the rule is ineffective, regulators resort to 
technological management to eliminate the possibility of x (using GPS to redesign the carts 
and trolleys so that they are immobilised once they reach their permitted limits). Even if the 
rule that prohibits x is superseded by technological management and ‘retired’, it is not 
entirely redundant because it expresses the regulators’ normative view (namely, that 
regulatees ought not to do x). The significance of this linkage is that it suggests one way of 
testing whether a particular use of technological management satisfies the Rule of Law. Quite 
simply, if the rule to which the technological management is linked satisfies the Rule of Law, 
then (assuming that the technological measures are congruent with the rule, and unless there 
are additional requirements for the use of technological management) the particular use of 
technological management also satisfies the Rule of Law.5  
In a case where there is not already a rule that prohibits x, but where the regulator clearly 
believes that regulatees ought not to do x, then the use of technological management by the 
regulator to make it impossible to do x can be tested for Rule of Law compliance in a similar 
way. Here, the linkage is between the use of technological management and the rule that 
regulators would have put in place if they had adopted a rule that prohibits x. If such a rule 
would not have satisfied the Rule of Law, then the measures of technological management 
will also fail to do so. Conversely, if such a rule would have satisfied the Rule of Law, then 
technological management will also be compliant unless there are additional requirements for 
the use of such regulatory measures.       
Accordingly, where non-normative technological management is linked in this way to an 
implicit normative view, the regulatory position is as follows: 
 
4  Two other points to emphasise are: (i) by focusing on technological management, I am putting in the 
spotlight an extreme case—technological measures that aim to compel regulatees to do x, or to 
eliminate the possibility of them doing z (even if x and y remain possible), go well beyond a ‘nudge’; 
and (ii) by focusing on technological management as an ideal-type, I might be departing from what is 
realistically practicable for regulators—for example, in practice, there might be problems with 
technological malfunction and failure as well as regulatee counter-measures and workarounds. 
Compare, e.g., Charles Fried, ‘Perfect Freedom or Perfect Control?’ (2000) 114 Harvard Law Review 
606.  
 
5  Compare Lodewijk Asscher, ‘‟Code” as Law. Using Fuller to Assess Code Rules’ in E. Dommering 
and L. Asscher (eds), Coding Regulation: Essays on the Normative Role of Information Technology 
(The Hague: TMC Asser, 2006) 61, at 86: 
 
 Code can present constraints on human behaviour that can be compared with constraints by traditional 
laws. We have argued that even though code is not law, in some instances it can be useful to ask the 
same questions about code regulation as we do about traditional regulation. Code as law must be 
assessed by looking at the results of regulation in terms of freedom and individual autonomy and 
compared to the balance struck in traditional law. 
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• a regulator, R, has a view about whether regulatees should be required to, permitted 
to, or prohibited from doing x (the underlying normative view) 
• R’s view could be expressed in the form of a rule that requires, permits, or prohibits 
the doing of x (the underlying rule) 
• but, R uses (or directs others to use)6 technological management rather than a rule 
• and R’s intention in doing so is to translate the underlying normative view into a 
practical design that ensures that regulatees do or do not do x (according to the 
underlying rule) 
• the ensuing outcome being that regulatees find themselves in environments where the 
immediate signals relate to what can and cannot be done, to possibilities and 
impossibilities, rather than to the underlying normative pattern of what ought or ought 
not to be done. 
So far, so good: however, in previous papers, I have given technological management a broad 
sweep, ranging across the design of products, the automation of processes, the architecture of 
places, and even the modification of persons.7 In some of these cases, the link to a normative 
regulatory intent might be much less clear.  
Suppose, for example, that a supermarket decides, for reasons of efficiency, to automate 
shelf-stacking. This use of technological management results in the loss of shelf-stacking 
jobs; and, in due course, it becomes impossible to find work stacking supermarket shelves. 
Yet, is it plausible to suggest that the supermarket has the view that humans ought not to be 
working stacking shelves? In other cases of automation, where the intention is to improve the 
conditions for human health and safety, it might be more plausible to suggest that the 
technological measures link to a normative regulatory intent. But, we could find ourselves 
agonising about how to characterise such cases—whether to treat them as cases of an implicit 
normative regulatory intent or as cases where technological management happens to have 
regulatory effects. For present purposes, I suggest that we simply reverse engineer all these 
cases, ignoring whether the regulators actually had a normative intention, and treat the 
questionable regulatory effect as if it were provided for by a rule or policy. Then, if the ‘as if’ 
rule or policy would satisfy the Rule of Law, the same applies to technological 
management—at any rate, it does so unless there are additional requirements for the use of 
such regulatory measures.  
To illustrate, we can recall the famous and much-debated case of Robert Moses’ bridges on 
the New York parkways. We can debate endlessly whether or not the design of the bridges 
was intended to have the (racially discriminatory) effect of making it more difficult for the 
 
6  See, further, my introductory remarks in Part 6. 
 
7  See, e.g., ‘In the Year 2061: From Law to Technological Management’ (n 1) at 8, where I say: 
‘Distinctively, technological management—typically involving the design of products or places, or the 
automation of processes—seeks to exclude (i) the possibility of certain actions which, in the absence of 
this strategy, might be subject only to rule regulation or (ii) human agents who otherwise would be 
implicated in the regulated activities.’ 
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poor, mainly black, population to reach the beaches on Long Island.8 However, from the 
point of view of prospective beach-users, it made little difference whether the bridges had 
been designed with this intent⎯in practice, the bridges had the regulative effect of making 
the beaches more difficult to access; and, if regulatees wish to challenge the design on the 
basis that the Rule of Law is not satisfied, it might seem altogether too nice to have this 
question turn on whether the bridge designers had an underlying racially discriminatory 
normative regulatory intent. Rather, making the ‘as if’ assumption, we can ask whether a rule  
or policy having such a racially discriminatory effect would satisfy the Rule of Law; if it 
would not, the technological management reflected in the design of the bridges is not 
compliant.   
3. The Rule of Law 
When we ask whether a particular use of technological management satisfies ‘the Rule of 
Law’, some might respond: ‘Well, it depends on what you mean by the Rule of Law.’ This is 
a fair comment, for the Rule of Law means many different things to different people, 
sometimes being directed at ‘lawless’ governance, at other times at ‘a lack of respect for the 
law’ evinced by those subjects who break the rules. In this respect, Lisa Austin and Dennis 
Klimchuk are surely right in saying that, while there is ‘widespread agreement’ that the core 
elements of the Rule of Law ‘are the principles that a right to exercise power arbitrarily 
cannot be conferred or upheld by law, and that anything that claims the status of law must be 
able to guide action’,9 there remains plenty of scope for disagreement. For example, the core 
principles themselves are open to interpretation: the idea of arbitrariness can be applied to 
more than one pathology of the exercise of power10; and, as I have pointed out elsewhere, 
there is now a major questionmark about whether instruments of technological management 
meet the ‘action-guiding’ test for laws.11 Moreover, beyond the core principles, there is—to 
put it conservatively—‘substantial disagreement’ about such matters as the moral standards 
(if any) that are embedded in the Rule of Law and about its relationship with other ideals and 
values.12  It follows that there is no unproblematic place either to start or to finish with one’s 
conception of the Rule of Law. 
Let me start, then, with my own understanding of the Rule of Law. Stated shortly, my 
understanding involves four related points:13 first, the Rule of Law has to be read alongside 
 
8  See Noëmi Manders-Huits and Jeroen van den Hoven, ‘The Need for a Value-Sensitive Design of 
Communication Infrastructures’ in Paul Sollie and Marcus Düwell (eds), Evaluating New Technologies 
(Springer, 2009) 51, 54. 
 
9  Lisa M. Austin and Dennis Klimchuk, ‘Introduction’ in Lisa M. Austin and Dennis Klimchuk (eds), 
Private Law and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 1, at 1. 
 
10  See, e.g., the careful analysis of ‘arbitrariness’ (applied to the criteria of legality) in William N. Lucy, 
‘The Rule of Law and Private Law’ in Austin and Klimchuk (n 9) 41. 
 
11  See, e.g., Roger Brownsword, ‘In the Year 2061: From Law to Technological Management’ (n 1). 
 
12  Austin and Klimchuk (n 9) at 1. 
 
13  See Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 2). 
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one’s conception of law—it belongs to the same conceptual scheme; secondly, my 
conception of law is of a legal idealist kind, informed substantively by the principles 
associated with Alan Gewirth’s moral theory, and realised in practice as a community of 
rights14; thirdly, because those substantive principles are open to interpretation and because 
communities of rights may reasonably disagree on particular moral questions, there has to be 
a strategy for resolving disputes and maintaining order in these harder cases; fourthly, that 
strategy is the Rule of Law, demanding on the one side a good faith attempt by legal officials 
to act in accordance with the community’s moral values and, on the other, respect by citizens 
for such attempts where they are made (even though citizens might disagree with the official 
reading of what is morally required). In other words, the Rule of Law enjoins communities of 
rights to resolve their moral disagreements not by excluding moral reason from legal and 
regulatory decision-making but by respecting good faith attempts to engage with the 
difficulties and instate a provisional position. For the purposes of the present discussion, 
although I will stick with the idea of the Rule of Law as a compact between regulators and 
regulatees, I will not insist on the Gewirthian high ground (which is hotly contested and 
which might divert attention from the issue that I want to put in the spotlight, namely the 
possible applicability to technological management of the more commonly agreed features of 
the Rule of Law).  
Accordingly, I will proceed on the basis that the ideal of the Rule of Law has two inter-linked 
core elements, one condemning arbitrary governance (as per Austin and Klimchuk) and the 
other condemning irresponsible citizenship. Viewed in this way, the Rule of Law represents a 
compact between, on the one hand, lawmakers, law-enforcers, law-interpreters, and law-
appliers and, on the other hand, the citizenry. On the one side, we have a ‘theory of (official) 
accountability’; on the other, we have a ‘theory of (citizen) restraint’.15 The understanding 
represented by the compact is that the actions of those who are in the position of the former 
should always be in accordance with the authorising constitutive rules (with whatever 
procedural and substantive conditions are specified); and that, provided that the relevant 
actions are in accordance with the constitutive rules, then citizens (including lawmakers, law-
enforcers, law-interpreters, and law-appliers in their capacity as citizens) should respect the 
legal rules and decisions so made. In this sense, no one—whether acting off-line or on-line—
is above the law16; and the Rule of Law signifies that the law rules. 
Similarly, if we apply this ideal to the acts of regulators—whether these are acts that set 
standards, or that monitor compliance, or that take corrective steps in response to non-
 
 
14  Seminally, see Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); and 
The Community of Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
 
15  See Beyleveld and Brownsword (1986) (n 2) Chs 7-9.  
 
16  Compare Joel R. Reidenberg, ‘Technology and Internet Jurisdiction’ (2005) 153 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1951, resisting the claims of the ‘Internet separatists’ and defending the 
application of the Rule of Law to on-line environments. 
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compliance—then those acts should respect the constitutive limits and, in turn, they should be 
respected by regulatees provided that the constitutive rules are observed.17  
In principle, we might also—and, indeed, I believe that we should—apply the ideal of the 
Rule of Law to technological management. The fact that regulators who employ 
technological management resort to a non-normative instrument does not mean that the 
compact is no longer relevant. On the one side, it remains important that governance—now in 
the form of power exercised through technological management—is properly authorised and 
limited; and, on the other, although citizens might have less opportunity for ‘non-
compliance’, it is important that the constraints imposed by technological management are 
respected. To be sure, the context of regulation by technological management is very 
different to that of a normative legal environment but the spirit and intent of the compact 
remains relevant.    
The compact represented by the Rule of Law hinges on reciprocal constraints—first, 
constraints on the way in which the power of the Law is exercised by its institutions, its 
officers, and its agents; and, secondly, constraints on citizens who are expected to respect 
laws that are properly made. However, in at least two respects, this compact is unstable. First, 
if there is defection on either side, and if this escalates, then there can be a downward spiral 
that leads to a breakdown of trust and even a breakdown in order. Secondly, the constitutive 
rules might be more or less constraining—for example, reflecting merely formal, or 
formal/procedural, or substantive requirements,18 and thin or thick specifications. Depending 
on the detail of the constraining rules, this will shape how we interpret the line between 
arbitrary and non-arbitrary governance as well as whether we judge citizens to be acting 
responsibly or irresponsibly in their response to acts of governance.19  
In a well-known thick substantive conception, the International Commission of Jurists’ 
Declaration of Delhi recognises the Rule of Law as  
 
17  Compare Karen Yeung, Securing Compliance (Oxford: Hart, 2004). 
 
18  See, e.g., Paul P. Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework’ [1997] Public Law 467. At 467, Craig explains that whilst formal conceptions ‘address the 
manner in which the law was promulgated (was it by a properly authorised person, in a properly 
authorised manner, etc.); the clarity of the ensuing norm (was it sufficiently clear to guide an 
individual's conduct so as to enable a person to plan his or her life, etc.); and the temporal dimension of 
the enacted norm (was it prospective or retrospective, etc.)’, they do not ‘seek to pass judgment upon 
the actual content of the law itself.’ By contrast, substantive conceptions ‘wish to take the doctrine 
further. Certain substantive rights are said to be based on, or derived from, the rule of law. The concept 
is used as the foundation for these rights, which are then used to distinguish between “good” laws, 
which comply with such rights, and “bad” laws which do not.’ For a conception that is neither 
straightforwardly formal nor substantive, see Hildebrandt (n 2), esp 54-57 for the way in which she 
draws a distinction between ‘legalism’ (roughly a formal requirement but, as in Craig, extendable to 
procedural features of a Fullerian kind) and the more demanding notion of ‘legality’ (where the 
institutional backcloth, particularly the courts, and the availability of effective remedies are critical).  
 
19  Generally, see Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtues’ (1977) 93 LQR 195; and David 
Dyzenhaus, ‘Recrafting the Rule of Law’ in David Dyzenhaus (ed), Recrafting the Rule of Law 
(Oxford: Hart, 1999) 1.  
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a dynamic concept for the expansion and fulfilment of which jurists are primarily 
responsible and which should be employed not only to safeguard and advance the 
civil and political rights of the individual in a free society, but also to establish social, 
economic, educational and cultural conditions under which his legitimate aspirations 
and dignity may be realized.20 
By contrast, a thin version of the Rule of Law might demand only that acts of governance 
should be capable of guiding the behaviour of citizens; and this might be how we should 
interpret Lon Fuller’s principles of the ‘inner morality of law’ which require rules of law to 
be published and prospective, to be clear, constant, and non-contradictory, and to be 
administered in a way that is congruent with their published terms, and so on.21 However, 
unless further requirements are to be teased out of such thin versions, then, as Joseph Raz 
points out, they do not speak to ‘how the law is to be made: by tyrants, democratic majorities 
or any other way’; and it ‘says nothing about fundamental rights, about equality or justice.’22 
It follows that, if the only constraint on the power of the Law is whatever set of constitutive 
rules is adopted locally, and if these rules constrain only marginally, then the commitment to 
the Rule of Law might be some, but no great, improvement on unbridled power.23 Although 
there might be some political contexts—for example, when a State is being rebuilt—where 
such an undemanding requirement might be sufficient to create the expectation that citizens 
will respect the law, in general, this will be an unreasonable demand. As a rule, where the 
constraints on the power of the Law are weak, the demand for respect by citizens will be 
correspondingly weak. The risk is that, before long, there will be no real commitment to the 
compact and the Rule of Law will be deployed rhetorically in what becomes a contest of 
power and persuasion. 
There is also the possibility of internal tensions within the Rule of Law. For example, the 
‘negative’ dimension of legality, holding that ‘the highest concern of a legal system should be 
to protect the citizenry against an aggressive state’ and insisting that the State should give 
citizens a fair warning that they are breaking the rules, might come into tension with the 
‘positive’ dimension of legality ‘which stands for consistency and completeness in the 
application of the law’ and which emphasises the importance of the guilty being punished.24 
While the former (the ‘shield’ of the Rule of Law) tends to encourage restrictive (and literal) 
interpretation of penal statutes, the latter (the ‘sword’) encourages a broad reading of criminal 
 
20  Available at http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/1959/01/Rule-of-law-in-a-free-
society-conference-report-1959-eng.pdf. 
 
21  Fuller (n 3). 
 
22  Raz (n 19) at 198. It might be possible to ‘thicken up’ the Fullerian version in both respects (both as to 
how the law is to be made and as to its substance). See, further, Part 6. 
 
23  For a compelling discussion, see Judith N. Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1964). 
 
24  See George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
both quotes at p. 207. 
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statutes ‘with a view to capturing within their scope all those who are guilty or who can 
usefully be regarded as guilty.’25 
It has to be conceded, therefore, that referring the legitimacy of the use of technological 
management to the Rule of Law is not unproblematic. The concept is contested.26 
Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement that the kind of procedural principles listed by 
Lon Fuller are at least an essential element of the Rule of Law;27 and it is these principles that 
will be employed in Part 6 of the paper as a test for the legality of the use of measures of 
technological management.   
4. Instrumentalism and technological management 
The first of our four questions draws on the concern expressed by Brian Tamanaha that, in 
some legal orders, there has been a rise in ‘instrumentalism’—for example, rules of law being 
brokered in political institutions by powerful interest groups and elites, without any concern 
for the larger public interest or common good—all with deleterious consequences for the 
Rule of Law.28 Given that technological management might seem to be an example of 
instrumentalism writ large, we need to ask whether, for this reason, it is antithetical to the 
Rule of Law. 
We can start by asking how respect for the Rule of Law conduces to good governance. 
According to Tamanaha, four ideals are fundamental to this project. These are: 
that the law is a principled preserver of justice, that the law serves the public good, 
that legal rules are binding on government officials (not only the public), and that 
judges must render decisions in an objective fashion based upon the law.29 
Potentially, instrumentalist politics and adjudication is a threat to legality and good 
governance. However, provided that these fundamental ideals are respected, Tamanaha has 
no problem about instrumentalist reasoning—indeed, he says that the idea of law as a means 
 
25  Ibid., at 209. 
 
26  For a very helpful account of the historical contestation (reaching back to Aristotle) that is associated 
with the Rule of Law and of the way in which, in the present century,  the concept can be meaningfully 
and productively contested, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept 
(in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 137. 
 
27  As Waldron (n 26) points out, Fuller’s ‘laundry list’ has been adopted by many others, including John 
Finnis, in Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) at 270. See, too, Cass R. 
Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996),  at 102-106, 
who following Fuller identifies the following six characteristics that are associated with the Rule of 
Law: clear, general, publicly accessible rules laid down in advance; prospectivity; conformity between 
law on the books and law in the world; hearing rights and availability of review by independent 
adjudicative officials; separation between lawmaking and law-implementation; and no rapid changes in 
the content of law as well as no contradictions or inconsistency in the law.  
 
28  See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
 
29  Ibid., at 249. 
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to an end ‘would be a positive component if integrated within a broader system with strong 
commitments to these four ideals.’30 The pathology of instrumentalism arises where the use 
of legislatures and courts in pursuit of (partisan) ends together with the acts of officials within 
those institutions is no longer constrained by the Rule of Law. It follows, argues Tamanaha, 
that ‘legislators must be genuinely oriented toward enacting laws that are in the common 
good or public interest’; that ‘government officials must see it as their solemn duty to abide 
by the law in good faith; this duty is not satisfied by the manipulation of law and legal 
processes to achieve objectives’; and ‘that judges, when rendering their decisions, must be 
committed to searching for the strongest, most correct legal answer; they must resist the 
temptation to succumb to the power they have to exploit the inherent indeterminacy of law to 
produce results they desire.’31 
If the use of technological management, its overt instrumentalism notwithstanding, is to be 
compatible with the Rule of Law, what lessons should we take from Tamanaha? Clearly, 
Tamanaha’s thesis is not that instrumentalism (or means-to-end reasoning) in itself is 
objectionable; rather, it is unconstrained instrumentalism (rather like the instrumentalisation 
of others, treating them only as a means and not also as an end) that is the problem. From 
Tamanaha’s perspective, if there is a problem with technological management, it is that its 
use is not sufficiently or appropriately constrained—that its use does not comport with the 
public interest or the common good.  
Quite which constraints are sufficient and appropriate, quite which conception of the 
common good or the public interest, quite which conception of justice is to be adopted, are 
matters that remain to be debated.32 However, if the constraints set by the Rule of Law are so 
weak as to tolerate an instrumentalism that turns the institutions of (so-called) law into arenas 
for pure power politics, then there is a problem because the underlying compact is likely to 
break down. To expect citizens to respect the use of technological management, or the 
particular purposes served by technological management, in such circumstances is manifestly 
unreasonable; it puts an intolerable strain on the compact. If the Rule of Law is to have any 
chance of prospering, it needs to represent a significant constraint against instrumentalist 
thinking; the constitutive rules need to be acceptable to all sections of the community; and, 
regulators need to fully respect those rules and operate in accordance with them. 
5. Technological management and abuse of power 
Building on the closing remarks of the previous section, we come to our second question. 
How might we judge whether the use of technological management, by both public and 
private actors, involves an abuse of power? If the use of technological management is likened 
to the use of rules, then a minimum requirement is that such a strategy is used only in ways 
that accord with the constitutive rules, or any authorising or limiting rules made thereunder. 
 
30  Ibid. 
 
31  Ibid., at 250 (emphases in original). 
 
32  Nb my remarks about the application of substantive Gewirthian principles in n 2. 
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Or to put this another way, if the underlying rule in the paradigmatic case of technological 
management would be condemned as an abuse of power, then the same should apply to the 
technological instruments that are actually used. In principle, this applies to the use of 
technological management by both public and private regulators; and, any failure to respect 
the Rule of Law compact will be an abuse of power.33 
There is more than one way in which it might be claimed that a particular use of 
technological management involves an abuse of power (and is, thus, inconsistent with the 
Rule of Law). For example, to anticipate our discussion of the Fullerian principles of legality, 
it might be argued that legality demands that the use of technological management should be 
expressly authorised (whether by general or particular authorising provisions) and that, in the 
instant case, there is no such authorisation; or that there has been a failure to follow an 
approved procedure for the adoption of technological management.34 Or, to anticipate our 
later discussion of the special limits that might be imposed on the use of technological 
management, it might be argued that, in a particular case, the use is simply in breach of those 
limits. However, in this part of the paper, I want to focus on the claim that the content of the 
underlying rule is either incompatible with the positive laws of the legal system or 
incompatible with implicit cosmopolitan norms. 
Where the positive law already protects certain interests, such that a rule impinging on those 
interests would be struck out as unconstitutional or ultra vires or unlawful, then technological 
management (and the underlying rule) will be susceptible to the same kind of challenge. In 
this vein, Lawrence Lessig famously flagged up the risk that digital rights management 
technologies might be used in ways that overreach the proprietors’ lawful interests—for 
example, by denying some uses that would fall within one of the exceptions recognised by 
copyright law.35 No doubt, we could generalise this concern. For example, to recall a case 
that provoked much discussion at the TELOS launch conference at King’s College London in 
2007, we might challenge the use of a device such as the ‘Mosquito’ (which emits a piercing 
high-pitched sound that is audible only to teenagers) in order to discourage young people 
from congregating (lawfully although inconveniently) outside shops or in other public places. 
On the other hand, where shopkeepers install technological management to prevent 
 
33  It is implicit in these remarks that I agree with Austin and Klimchuk (n 9) that it is a mistake to limit 
the application of the Rule of Law to the exercise of public power; the exercise of private power also 
needs to be tested for its ‘legality’.  
 
34  Where a community is committed to the ideals of deliberative democracy, it will be a condition of the 
Rule of Law that there needs to be a transparent and inclusive public debate about use of technological 
management as an element of a risk management package. It will be a condition that all views should 
be heard with regard to whether the package amounts to an acceptable balance of benefit and risk 
(including the benefits of risks of the use of technological management)  as well as representing a fair 
distribution of such risk and benefit (including adequate compensatory provisions). Before the 
particular package can command respect, it needs to be somewhere on the spectrum of reasonableness. 
This is not to suggest that all regulatees must agree that the package is optimal; but it must at least be 
reasonable in the weak sense that it is not a package that is so unreasonable that no rational regulator 
could, in good faith, adopt it. 
35  See Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New 
York: Knopf Doubleday, 2002). 
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shoplifting or when supermarkets fit GPS to prevent the wheeling away of their trolleys, this 
is in line with the rules that already express norms that are supposed to protect their 
proprietary interests. The principle that governs such cases is clear: private power must be 
exercised in ways that are compatible with the protected legal interests of others as well as 
the larger public interest. So, whether copyright holders try to protect their interests by 
contract or by technology, they should do so only to the extent that this is consistent with the 
protected legal interests of others; and the same applies to Mosquito-using  shopkeepers who 
would prefer teenagers to congregate some place else.  
When we turn to the use of regulating technologies by public bodies, the principle is again 
clear. Public bodies must act within their lawful powers and in a way that is compatible with 
respect for the constitutive rules (including where they are recognised as constitutive, respect 
for human rights provisions).36 Currently, when the criminal justice agencies are increasingly 
relying on tracking, monitoring, identifying, and locating technologies (such as, CCTV, GPS, 
RFID, and DNA profiling) respect for the right to privacy is the main restriction on unbridled 
use. In the Marper case,37 the European Court of Human Rights has emphasised that the 
impingement on privacy must be ‘proportionate’; and, in Jones, the United States’ Supreme 
Court has affirmed the relevance of constitutional limits, specifically the Fourth Amendment, 
to chipping and tracking vehicles on public roads.38  Similarly, we can assume that the 
interest in privacy—possibly in conjunction with freedom of conscience or religion or 
expression—would be an obvious basis for challenging a disproportionate future use of brain 
imaging or other scanning (e.g. thermal imaging) technologies.39  
Strictly speaking, where technologies are employed for the purposes of surveillance, tracking, 
monitoring, identifying, and locating, and the like, they fall short of technological 
management—because, in these applications, they support the background criminal law 
without actually redesigning the regulatory environment in a way that eliminates the 
possibility of a particular action. Where regulatees are aware that they are under surveillance, 
they might be deterred from doing x; but they might not. By contrast, in an ideal-typical case 
of a technologically managed environment, regulatees would find that that it was simply not 
possible to do x. Nevertheless, so far as questions of abuse of power are concerned, the 
principle is the same: the employment and application of technological management must be 
consistent with whatever constitutive rules and principles authorise and limit its use. 
 
36  See Ben Bowling, Amber Marks, and Cian Murphy, ‘Crime Control Technologies: Toward an 
Analytical Framework and Research Agenda’ in Roger Brownsword and Karen Yeung (eds), 
Regulating Technologies (Oxford: Hart, 2008) 51. 
 
37  S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581. 
 
38  United States v Jones 132 S.Ct 945 (2012). 
 
39  See Kyllo v United States 533 US 27 (2001) (police use of heat-sensing technology to detect domestic 
cannabis growing); and, for privacy and brain imaging, see Roger Brownsword, ‘Regulating Brain 
Imaging: Questions of Privacy and Informed Consent’ in Sarah J.L. Edwards, Sarah Richmond, and 
Geraint Rees (eds), I Know What You Are Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012) 223. 
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Going beyond the explicit authorising provisions and protections of a particular legal system, 
it might be claimed that some use of technological management is incompatible with 
fundamental ‘cosmopolitan’ values.40 One such candidate, of course, is human rights; another 
is human dignity; and, in this spirit, we find Article 2(d) of the UNESCO Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2005, recognising the importance of, and the 
benefits to be derived from, scientific and technological developments but emphasising that 
such developments should always ‘respect human dignity, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’. Of course, there are many legal systems that already embed these values in their 
positive constitutive rules; and, indeed, there is already a considerable jurisprudence 
associated with these values.41 However, the cosmopolitan claim is that there are some values 
that are binding on regulators everywhere irrespective of whether they are recognised locally. 
In this context, suppose that it is claimed that a particular use of technological management is 
incompatible with the cosmopolitan value of human dignity.  For example, imagine that this 
were the objection levelled against the proposal that human prison officers should be replaced 
by robots—a proposal, let us suppose, that is backed by considerations of efficiency but also 
in order to eliminate the risk of prisoners assaulting and injuring human prison officers.42 
What should we say about such techno-management of prison conditions? Would this 
compromise human dignity? Guided by some of the jurisprudence (perhaps by the 
jurisprudence that has developed around Article 1 of the German Basic Law), it might be 
argued that human dignity condemns prison conditions that are judged to be demeaning or 
degrading.43  Whether or not robotic prison officers would fall foul of this principle is a moot 
point. For example, it might be argued that, if prisoners are denied contact with human prison 
officers, then this treats them as less than human—in the language of the German 
constitutional jurisprudence, the prisoners are ‘degraded to a mere object of state action.’44 
Do the robot prison officers really understand the difference between mere objects/things and 
human beings? On the other hand, those humans who design the prison management regimes 
do understand this difference and, if their designs reflect this understanding, then perhaps this 
suffices. Moreover, if cars and trains operated by robots do not offend the principle of human 
dignity, and if (as some accept) there is no fundamental problem about the use of robots to 
perform social caring functions, then why should robotic prisoner officers be any different?  
 
40  Compare Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) Ch 7; and ‘Regulatory Cosmopolitanism: Clubs, Commons, and Questions of 
Coherence’ TILT Working Papers No 18 (2010). 
 
41  See, Roger Brownsword, ‘Human Dignity from a Legal Perspective’ in M.Duwell, J. Braavig, R. 
Brownsword, and D. Mieth (eds), Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) 1. 
  
42  For the piloting of such a scheme in South Korea, see Lena Kim, ‘Meet South Korea’s New Robotic 
Prison Guards’ Digital Trends (April 21, 2012): available at 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/international/meet-south-koreas-new-robotic-prison-guards/. 
 
43  See, Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) 14-15. 
 
44  See, the Honecker Decision BerlVerfGH NJW 1993, 515, 517. 
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The problem with appeals to human dignity (whether as a recognised fundamental legal value 
or as a candidate cosmopolitan value) is that, as with appeals to the Rule of Law, the concept 
is deeply contested and it is subject to many competing interpretations. In fact, some see 
human dignity as underlying the Rule of Law because, by following the publicly declared 
rules, government and legal officials act in ways that are reasonably predictable which, in 
turn, enables citizens to plan their lives—that is to say, the Rule of Law is in line with respect 
for human dignity because it respects human autonomy.45 However, more ‘conservative’ 
readings of human dignity—reflected in the view that we should not transfer our distinctively 
human responsibilities to robots46—tend to emphasise the limits on human autonomy. Faced 
with the all too familiar stand-off between those who appeal to ‘human dignity as 
empowerment’ in order to support access to new technologies and those who appeal to 
‘human dignity as constraint’ (or simply to dignity) in order to resist access,47 we might 
retreat to a position in which human dignity is equated with the capacity for moral reason. On 
this view, the distinctive dignity of humans resides in their capacity freely to do the right 
thing even when they have the opportunity to do the wrong thing.48 From this perspective, the 
fundamental objection to Roboprison is that the conditions for the moral rehabilitation of 
offenders—now having reduced contact with other humans—are compromised.49 If this line 
of thinking is correct, then  it follows, as I have argued elsewhere,50 that we need to monitor 
the changing complexion of the regulatory environment lest, through the use of technological 
management, the conditions for moral community are compromised; and, if we treat it as a 
defining characteristic of the Rule of Law that it serves human dignity in this sense, then we 
will judge that government abuses its powers where it resorts to technological management in 
this fundamentally compromising way.     
6. Technological management and the generic ideals of legality 
We come now to the third and largest of our questions. The context in which jurists have 
crafted their understanding of legality and of the Rule of Law is that of rules. As Cass 
 
45  For example, Raz (n 19) explicitly takes the view. 
 
46  Compare, Roger Brownsword, ‘Regulating Patient Safety: Is it Time for a Technological Response?’ 
(2014) 6 Law, Innovation and Technology 1. 
 
47  See, Beyleveld and  Brownsword (n 43). 
 
48  See, Roger Brownsword, ‘Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Simply Trying to Do the Right Thing’, 
in Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford: Proceedings of the British 
Academy and Oxford University Press, 2013) 470; and ‘Developing a Modern Understanding of 
Human Dignity’ in Dietmar Grimm, Alexandra Kemmerer, and Christoph Moller (eds), Human Dignity 
in Context (Berlin Hart/Nomos volume, 2016). 
49  But the potential for rehabilitating contact with robots should not be ignored: see, e.g., Judith Newman, 
‘To Siri, With Love; How One Boy with Autism Became BFF with Apple’s Siri’ The New York Times, 
October 17, 2014: available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/fashion/how-apples-siri-became-
one-autistic-boys-bff.html?_r=1 (last accessed February 8, 2016). 
 
50  Roger Brownsword, ‘Lost in Translation: Legality, Regulatory Margins, and Technological 
Management’ (n 1). 
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Sunstein remarks, ‘A system of rules is often thought to be the signal virtue of a regime of 
law. Indeed, the rule of law might seem to require a system of rules.’51 However, as 
regulators begin to rely on the non-normative design and coding that is characteristic of 
technological management, do the principles that we associate with legality continue to be 
applicable? 
In a classic discussion of the ideal of ‘legality’, understood as a set of procedural 
requirements, Lon Fuller proposed that the standards set should be general, promulgated, 
prospective, clear, non-contradictory, (reasonably) constant, and possible (of compliance).52 
He also suggested that it was of the essence of the Rule of Law that enforcement should be 
congruent with the standards so promulgated. Where the standards are not promulgated, 
prospective, clear, non-contradictory, and (reasonably) constant, regulatees will simply not 
know where they stand; even if they wish to comply with the regulatory standard, they will 
not know what it is. If the standard set requires impossible acts of compliance, then ex 
hypothesi regulatees cannot comply. Reliance on highly specific regulations will drain most 
regulatory resource and, again, it will leave many regulatees unclear about their position. 
And, if there is a disconnect between the standards set and the enforcement practice, not only 
will regulatees be unclear about their position, they will lose respect for the regulatory 
regime.  
For many years, jurists have debated whether the Fullerian principles speak only to the 
conditions for effective regulation or whether, as Fuller insists, they go to the heart of 
distinctively legal forms of regulation.53 According to Fuller, there is a critical distinction 
between legal direction and mere managerial direction. As he puts it, ‘law is not, like 
management, a matter of directing other persons how to accomplish tasks set by a superior, 
but is basically a matter of providing the citizenry with a sound and stable framework for 
their interactions with one another, the role of the government being that of standing as a 
guardian of the integrity of this system.’54 Although, in the context of debates concerning the 
essential nature (or concept) of law, there is a fundamental choice between a moralised idea 
of law (evincing a necessary connection between law and morals) and an idea of law as a by 
and large effective institution for the direction of social life, it is a choice between one set of 
rules and another set of rules. On either conception of law, it is rules that are the currency; it 
is rules that are to be tested for their legality. For Fuller, as for his critics, law and 
 
51  Cass R. Sunstein (n 27) at 102. 
 
52  Lon L. Fuller (n 3). For an application of the Fullerian principles to ‘code’, see Asscher (n 5) who 
concludes that the key normative procedural criteria that must be fulfilled are ‘whether there are rules, 
whether those rules are transparent and consistent, whether there is any choice to obey the rules and 
how those rules relate to traditional legal rules’ (p. 86). See, too, Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘Criteria for 
Normative Technology: The Acceptability of ‘Code as Law’ in Light of Democratic and Constitutional 
Values’ in Roger Brownsword and Karen Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies (Oxford: Hart, 2008) 
157; and, for an application of Fullerian principles to particular instances of cyberlaw, see Chris Reed, 
‘How to Make Bad Law: Lessons from Cyberspace’ (2010) 73 MLR 903, esp at 914-916.  
 
53  See, e.g., HLA Hart’s review of The Morality of Law, at (1964-65) 78 Harvard Law Review 1281. 
 
54  Fuller (n 3), at 210. 
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management alike operate with normative registers; they are traditional regulatory 
environments. However, what happens when we move into next generation regulatory 
environments, where non-normative signals (speaking only to what is practicable or possible) 
co-exist with normative signals, or even predominate? In such environments, there are many 
concerns for the virtues of the Rule of Law; but what should we make of the applicability of 
the Fullerian criteria? 
Rather than dismissing out of hand the relevance of the Fullerian principles—on the ground 
that they relate only to normative regulatory strategies and not at all to non-normative 
strategies—we can consider briefly each of the principles, trying to capture its spirit and 
intent, with a view to understanding what it might signify for the acceptable use of 
technological management. In order to contextualise this discussion, let me suppose that the 
background is one of a working democracy with developed public institutions for policy-
making and regulation. Now, let me also suppose that in such a polity, when the possibility of 
using new technologies for regulatory purposes is appreciated, it is accepted that proposals 
for the use of technological instruments (including full-scale technological management) 
should be properly debated and authorised. Ideal-typically, this means that measures of 
technological management will be employed for public purposes only after (i) the particular 
regulatory purposes, and the particular actions to be channelled, have been approved and (ii) 
the use of particular measures of technological management for such purposes has been 
authorised. Of course, before the particular measures of technological management that have 
been authorised actually take their place in the regulatory environment, before regulatees find 
that their practical options and possibilities have been altered, there is an important step of 
direction (to use technological management) and compliance. Indeed, the direction might 
take the form of a rule (sic) that requires, say, providers of products or services to adopt some 
form of technological management; and, to this extent, rules are still being used to channel 
conduct (in this case, the conduct of producers and providers of goods and services). 
However, for end users of such products or services, it is technological management rather 
than a rule that channels their conduct in relation to such products or services. Where 
technological management is to be used for private purposes, there might also be some 
processes for ex ante approval and authorisation; but, in the absence of such procedures, there 
would be processes for ex post challenge and review. Given that such a polity already seems 
to exhibit in a general sense important features that we associate with the Rule of Law, the 
question is: what purchase would the Fullerian principles of legality have on such a polity?     
6.1 Laws should be promulgated 
In the polity that we have hypothesised, we can take it that there will be a commitment to the 
idea that public rules and regulations should be promulgated. For Fullerians, if regulatees are 
to be guided by the rules, then they need to know what the rules are, they need to know where 
they stand. In particular, where there are penalties for non-compliance, regulatees need to be 
given a fair warning if they are at risk, a fair opportunity to avoid the penalty. Stated shortly, 
the rule book needs to be accessible to regulatees.  
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Contrast this with a regulatory space that is technologically managed: in such a controlled 
environment, there is no rule book to be consulted; the relationship between regulators and 
regulatees is no longer mediated by rules; the actions of regulatees are no longer rule-guided. 
Does it follow that the requirement of promulgation is no longer relevant? In the sense that I 
have just indicated—that is to say, for the guidance of regulatees—promulgation is no longer 
relevant. However, promulgation and, by implication, transparency in relation to the 
proposed use of technological management for public regulatory purposes is, I suggest, 
extremely relevant. What matters in an age of technological management is not that the rules 
that result from a ‘law-making’ process are published, but that proposals for the use of 
technological management are published. What matters is not so much that regulatees know 
where they stand, but that they have a fair warning that a particular use of technological 
management might be made for public purposes and, concomitantly, a fair opportunity to 
participate in the processes that will determine whether such a use is to be authorised. If this 
is correct, then ‘promulgation’—not of rules, but of proposed uses of technological 
management—continues to be a critical ideal. There should be openness in authorising the 
use of technological management, in knowing that it is in operation, and arguably in knowing 
how it operates (otherwise there might be difficulties in challenging decisions made by the 
technology). 
Suppose, for example, it is proposed (i) that the ‘right to be forgotten’ should be recognised 
and (ii) that the relevant interest should be protected by measures of technological 
management. So long as institutions are habituated to discussing regulatory proposals in the 
form of draft rules, this might be the way in which the proposal is expressed; but the purpose 
of doing this would not be to guide the conduct of regulatees so much as to focus public 
debate about the merits of protecting this particular interest. Assuming that it was agreed that 
the particular interest should be protected, then the next step would be to propose that some 
measure of technological management might be employed to give effect to the regulatory 
purpose. Again, the proposal might take the form of an authorising rule. However, the 
function of the rule would not be to guide the conduct of regulatees, but to mandate the use of 
technological management. To repeat: while the purpose of promulgating such rules for 
debate and discussion would be to secure the legality of the use of technological 
management, they would not be signals to regulatees guiding their conduct. That said, as I 
have already noted, following authorisation, there might be a rule that requires some class of 
regulatees (such as providers of search engine services) to adopt and implement the approved 
measures of technological management. For these regulatees, there would still be rules to be 
followed. However, for regulatees in general, respect for the right to be forgotten would not 
be provided for by a rule; rather, assuming compliance by the service providers, the outcome 
of the regulatory process would be a technologically managed environment in which it would 
not be possible to infringe the protected interest.55 Unlike the Fullerian world, where the 
purpose of promulgation is to let regulatees know whether some act is permitted, in an age of 
 
55  Perhaps this is a good place to repeat my caveat in n 4: in practice, regulators might rarely, if ever, be 
able to realise the ideal of a perfectly controlled environment; technologies might fail; and regulatees 
might find ways around the technological fix. In practice, the ‘impossible’ might not be quite that. 
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technological management the purpose of promulgation is to invite public debate about the 
use of measures that, if approved, will redefine the practical options for regulatees.   
All being well, during the course of debating the proposal, there would be information about 
how the proposed measures of technological management would work. Bert-Jaap Koops 
highlights the importance of this kind of transparency by hypothesising the case of a street 
food seller who is denied a licence to operate in a zone that security services require to be 
risk-free.56  The seller does not understand why he is judged to be a safety risk; and, if there 
is to be due process, he needs to know on what basis the automated decision was made. 
Where one piece of data is determinative (such as, in Koops’ example, a criminal conviction 
twenty years earlier for being in possession of drugs), it should be possible for this to be 
given as the reason and then the seller might challenge the accuracy of, or weight given to, 
this data item. In other kinds of cases, where ‘advanced self-learning algorithms calculate 
risks based on complex combinations of factors’ it might be necessary to bring in 
independent third-party auditors, thereby providing ‘another type of checks and balances on 
the fairness of profiling-based decisions.’57 Summing up, Koops says that decision 
transparency in such cases could be effected ‘first, by a legal obligation to inform the 
applicant that the decision was based on profiling and allowing the applicant to request 
information about the logic involved in the profiling and, second, by architectural safeguards 
in risk assessment systems that aim at making the profiling more transparent, for example by 
marking in which proportion the outcome was influenced by data from each data source fed 
into the system and marking data in those sources that were used in consecutive steps when 
the profiling algorithm was run. Periodic independent audits could supplement the 
accountability of the decision-making process.’58 
 
56  Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘On Decision Transparency, or How to Enhance Data Protection after the 
Computational Turn’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries (eds), Privacy, Due Process and the 
Computational Turn (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) 196, at 212-213. 
 
57  Ibid., at 212. 
 
58  Ibid. That said, where decisions are automated, and particularly where machine learning is involved, it 
might not be possible to explain how the ‘black box’ elements of the system work. See, e.g., Tal 
Zarsky, ‘The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency and 
Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making’ (2016) 41 Science, Technology and Human 
Values 118 at 121: 
 
 [A] high level of automation in algorithmic processes could inherently increase opacity. 
Analysis based upon mined data, premised on thousands of parameters, may be difficult to 
explain to humans. Therefore, achieving transparency in such cases presents substantial 
challenges. Equally, the firm governing through such data analysis would find it difficult to 
adequately explain the ‘real reason’ for its automated response—even after making a good 
faith effort to do so. 
 
 This suggests that, if technological management, in order to be compatible with the Rule of Law, has to 
be transparent, then some forms of automation might be held back until their black boxes can be 
understood and explained. 
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In sum, in an age of technological management, promulgation remains an important aspect of 
legality. However, it is not the prohibitions, permissions and requirements of the rule-book 
that need to be published; rather, it is proposals for the use of technological management that 
need to be promulgated. It is not the rules that are the outputs of the regulatory process that 
need to be published (although, of course, they do) so much as the inputs into that process 
that need to be advertised. Promulgation bites on the regulatory process ex ante not ex post.  
6.2 Laws should be prospective rather than retrospective 
Next, we can consider the Fullerian injunction against the use of retrospective rules. No one 
surely would gainsay Fuller’s remark that a regime ‘composed exclusively of retrospective 
rules could exist only as a grotesque conceit worthy of Lewis Carroll or Franz Kafka.’59  
Certainly, where penalties are applied for breach of rules that have retrospective effect, this 
represents a paradigm of unfairness; regulatees not only do not know where they stand, they 
are denied a fair warning that they are non-compliant and that they are liable to be penalised. 
Even if the rules are themselves extremely unfair or difficult to justify, it is an independent 
requirement that they should be applied only with prospective effect. This is a basic 
requirement of due process. 
In a non-normative context, there might be some examples of technological management 
operating with retrospective effect: for example, digital records might be wiped clean and 
amended; and, in contractual relationships, there might be some retroactive adjustment of the 
parties’ positions. However, in general, where technological management is introduced to 
make a particular act impossible, or to remove what was previously a practical option, it takes 
effect as of then. No doubt, as in the Fullerian world of rules, it would be good practice to 
give regulatees fair warning that such technological measures are to be introduced; and, if 
regulatees operate on the assumption that what is possible in technologically managed 
environments is to be treated as permissible, then it would be unfair to penalise by 
retrospective rule or decree those regulatees who, in good faith, have acted on that 
assumption. However, on the face of it, technological management does not in itself 
introduce new risks of unfair retrospective penalisation of conduct. 
6.3 Laws should not require the impossible 
The injunction against requiring the impossible responds not only to the irrationality of 
requiring persons to defy the law of gravity or to be in two places at one and the same time, 
but also to the unfairness of penalising persons for failing to comply with rules that require 
the literally impossible or that impose penalties on persons who, through no fault of their 
own, find themselves in circumstances where compliance is simply not possible.60 On the 
face of it, because technological management operates in a mode that redefines what is 
possible and what is impossible within a particular regulatory space, it should not fall foul of 
requiring the impossible. To be sure, in some nightmarish world, regulators might introduce a 
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rule that requires regulatees to defy the restrictions imposed by technological management 
and penalises those who fail to succeed; but we can discount this bizarre possibility—this 
really would be the stuff of dystopian fiction.  
Rather, if the injunction against requiring the impossible has any continuing relevance, its 
thrust will be to avoid unfairly penalising regulatees in their various encounters with 
technological management. For example, would it be unfair to penalise an agent who 
attempts (but fails) to perform an act which that agent knows is impossible because it is 
prevented by technological management? Would it be unfair to punish a one-time and now 
frustrated vandal for persistently throwing stones at bus shelters equipped with shatterproof 
glass? Would it be unfair to penalise such a person if the defence put forward was, not that 
this would amount to punishing a person for failing to do a required act that was actually 
impossible, but that the act was innocuous and that no person should be punished for 
attempting but failing to do the impossible? 
According to George Fletcher, legal systems ‘seem to agree that impossible attempts are 
punishable if the behavior (sic) itself produces apprehension or generates apprehension in the 
mind of an ideal observer. For example, if someone shoots into the bed where her intended 
victim usually sleeps, the courts readily impose liability for attempted murder.’61 Where legal 
systems diverge is in relation to cases of seemingly innocent or innocuous acts such as 
‘purchasing talcum powder (thinking that it is heroin), putting sugar in an enemy’s coffee 
(thinking that it is cyanide), or administering a harmless substance to a pregnant woman 
(thinking that it is an abortifacient).’62 Taking a liberal approach, some legal systems 
emphasise that such acts are harmless: no harm is done; no harm could have been done; and 
so there is no case for criminalising such attempts. By contrast, a less liberal approach 
focuses on the attitude of the agent (who intends to cause harm).  On this view: 
The act of attempting must be judged by the actor’s ‘conception of the act.’ This 
means that if the actor assumes that the powder he buys is heroin or that the stuff he 
puts in the coffee is poison, his conduct is judged according to those facts. That there 
is no actual danger to anyone in these actions—and no manifestation of danger to 
unnerve the community—becomes irrelevant.63    
The justification for the latter approach is that by ‘deciding to commit a crime and acting on 
the decision, the individual pits himself against the community…the person who reveals his 
hostility toward the rights of other becomes too dangerous to tolerate.’64 No doubt, these are 
divisions that will reproduce themselves, if and when some regulatees attempt unsuccessfully 
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(but perhaps persistently) to do those acts that technological management has rendered 
impossible. 
Suppose, though, that the case in question is rather different. Here, let us suppose that some 
measure of technological management is prone to malfunction from time to time, such that an 
agent might in some circumstances be unclear whether a particular act was or was not 
possible (and by implication permissible). Should it be open to such an agent to plead that, 
where technological management is in place, ‘can implies may’? Paradoxically, perhaps, 
where the linkage between the preventive technological measures and the underlying 
normative pattern of prohibition is clear, it might be difficult for an agent to argue in good 
faith that they believed that can implied may; and where the linkage is less clear, unless ‘can 
implies may’ is a general default, the agent is making a (convenient) leap from the non-
normative actuality to the supposed underlying normative pattern.   
6.4 Laws should be clear 
The Fullerian principle relating to clarity insists that regulatees should not be left uncertain 
about what the rules require. If such uncertainty exists, the law is likely to be less effective 
than it might be; and, where penalties are attached to non-compliance, it is unfair to punish 
regulatees who are unclear about what the law requires—or, as it is commonly expressed, due 
process demands that there should be a fair warning that a particular act will breach the law.65 
When we switch to a context of technological management, the clarity of the regulatory 
signal might be somewhat less important but it is not entirely redundant. Regulators still need 
to communicate with their regulatees; and, crucially, they need to signal that only certain 
options are practically available. To this extent, clarity of transmission is still something that 
matters. Of course, if the regulatory environment, even a regulatory environment in which the 
signals are not clear, is designed in such a way that regulatees have no option other than to do 
x, they will eventually do x. Even so, x should be done with less friction and confusion where 
the regulatory signal is clearly and decisively transmitted.  
There is, however, another dimension to compliance in a space that is technologically 
managed. We can anticipate some contexts in which, although ‘rule compliance’ is 
technologically guaranteed, agents will still seek to be guided by rules that are familiar or by 
a rule-book. For example, chess-players will probably learn the rules of the game and be 
guided by the rules even though the boards and pieces that they use are designed to ensure 
that the rules cannot be broken. That said, there might be a market for ‘puzzle’ versions of 
games such as chess where the object of the exercise is to explore which moves the 
technological management allows and then to deduce what the rules of the game are. Where 
regulatees continue to seek guidance from the rules, the standard Fullerian ideals apply: the 
rules should be clear and comprehensible.  
 
65  For stock examples, see the reasoning of the Supreme Court in McBoyle v United States 283 US 25 
(1931) and Papachristou v City of Jacksonville 405 US 156 (1972); and see, too, United States v 
Cardiff (n 68). See, too, the discussion of the Rule of Law in A.P. Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, 
Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs (Oxford: Hart, 2014), Ch 11. 
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Predictably, though, rules, including the rules of games, are not always clear, 
comprehensible, or easy to apply. In such cases, technological management might be 
introduced to ensure that in these more problematic areas the rules are not broken. For 
example, on a stretch of motorway where there are frequently varying speed limits, motorists 
might be warned that they are entering a zone where the maximum speed of the vehicle will 
be technologically controlled. Provided that drivers know that this is the case, they will 
understand what is happening when, despite pressure on the accelerator pedal, the car simply 
will not increase speed.  
Then, there will be contexts in which agents no longer attempt to be guided by rules; they 
simply learn by experience that, in technologically managed environments, some things can 
be done and others cannot; or, as in driverless vehicles, they let the technology do the work. 
Again, provided that agents have a sense of where and what is technologically managed, they 
can operate successfully in these environments.   
6.5 Laws should be relatively constant 
While laws need to be revised from time to time, there is a problem if they are changed so 
frequently that regulatees are uncertain of their legal position. Just as a lack of clarity in the 
law breaches the fair warning principle, the same applies to a lack of constancy. Similarly, we 
might think that constancy has some value even in a non-normative regulatory environment. 
Indeed, as we have already noted, we might imagine that if some application of technological 
management sometimes prevents an act but at other times permits it—whether this arises 
from a technological malfunction or by a deliberate change made to the regulatory coding—
this can leave regulatees uncertain of their position. This invites some confusion, which is 
undesirable; but perhaps the real sting in this requirement is if penalties or other forms of 
detriment are suffered as a result of too many technological modifications. In such 
circumstances, the application of penalties, we can surely assume, would be a departure from 
the ideals of legality.66 
6.6 Laws should not be contradictory 
Legality, Fuller argues, aspires to the avoidance of contradiction—that is to say, contradiction 
between rules and/or precedents, contradiction within legislation, and so on. To recall one of 
Fuller’s examples, we might detect a contradiction in s 704 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act when it seemingly prohibited an inspector from entering a factory without the 
owner’s permission but, at the same time, prohibited the owner from refusing permission for 
the purpose of entering or inspecting the factory as authorised by s 704.67 No doubt, there are 
ways of resolving whatever contradiction is thought to arise from coupling (i) the inspector 
needing the owner’s permission to enter (implying the owner’s having the right to withhold 
permission) with (ii) the owner being required to grant permission—although, as Fuller 
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points out, not necessarily in ways that make any sense relative to the legislative purposes. 
However, in United States v Cardiff,68 the Supreme Court treated this contradiction as fatal, 
holding that the clash between these provisions meant that, for the purposes of a conviction 
under the criminal law, this was simply not good enough; the defendants were entitled to be 
given a fair warning that their conduct was subject to criminal penalty. 
Elsewhere, I have considered the circumstances in which rules or rulings will offend the 
principle of non-contradiction—in particular, whether it is contradictory for one rule to 
permit the doing of x in conjunction with another rule or ruling that declines to encourage or 
incentivise the doing of x.69 Clearly, the paradigmatic case of contradiction is where one rule 
prohibits the doing of x while another permits or requires the doing of x. However, what does 
non-contradiction imply in a context of technological management? Perhaps the obvious 
implication is that, in a particular situation, the relevant technologies should be consistent in 
allowing or disallowing a certain ‘act’. Where the technologies are simply talking to one 
another, some inconsistency might be inconvenient. However, if humans are misled by the 
inconsistency, and if there are penalties for doing some act that should have been prevented, 
but where the technology has failed, then it would seem to be unfair to apply the penalty—or, 
at any rate, it would be unfair if the agent acted in the good faith belief that, because the 
signal was set to ‘possible’, this implied that the act was permitted.  
6.7 The administration of the law should be congruent with its published rules 
As is well-known, Fuller attaches a very high importance to the principle of congruence, to 
officials administering the rules in accordance with the declared rules, rather than operating 
with a secret rule book. However, because technological management promises to close the 
normative gap (the possible gap between the standard as declared and as administered), 
congruence takes on a different significance.  
Where rules are administered by automated systems, congruence demands that the 
technology should faithfully follow the rules as intended. This presents a considerable 
challenge to the coding of rules.70 However, this is still recognisably an issue of legality 
within a Fullerian universe of rules. The question is whether congruence, or at any rate the 
spirit of congruence, has an application to a context of technological management. 
The spirit of congruence is that regulators and their enforcement agents should operate in a 
way that accords with the expectations of regulatees as reasonably formed on the basis of the 
regulatory signals. In a context of technological management, as we have remarked already, 
regulatees might reasonably expect that where an act is possible then regulators treat it as 
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optional and no negative regulatory reaction should ensue where the act is done—at least, this 
is so unless regulatees clearly know that there has been a malfunction or something of that 
kind (analogous to regulatees looting shops during a police strike or bringing in excess 
tobacco and alcohol during a strike by the customs and excise officials). So, congruence, 
along with clarity, constancy, and the like, demands that regulators and their agents do not 
penalise regulatees who, in good faith, have misunderstood the regulatory position.  
Similarly, regulatees will reasonably expect that where they follow the technologically 
managed procedure (such as paying the correct fee for the use of a toll road) they will be able 
to proceed as planned. If the technology fails to allow the reasonably expected next step, this 
might diminish the respect that regulatees have for the system.71  
It is also within the spirit of congruence that the articulation of technological management 
should be within the limits that have been published for its particular use as well as coherent 
with background limiting principles. On any understanding of the Rule of Law, powers 
should be operationalised in a way that is intra vires; and, as we have seen already in Part 5 of 
this paper, the rules and principles that set the limits for the use of technological management 
are a key reference point for the purpose of determining whether there has been an abuse of 
power.   
6.8 Laws should be general 
Fuller, recalling the historic abuse of prerogative power, also identifies ad hominem ‘rules’ as 
contrary to the very idea of legality. Of course, courts hand down rulings that apply only to 
the particular parties, but legislative acts should be of general application. By contrast, in an 
age of technological management, we can expect there to be ubiquitous use of algorithms that 
classify, sort, and profile persons.  
Imagine that, in the future, technological management fundamentally alters the trajectory of 
the criminal justice system, turning it into a scheme for ex ante prediction, prevention, and (in 
a new sense) ‘punishment’ rather than ex post reaction.72 Central to such a strategy might be 
the use of technologies to identify ‘dangerous’ classes, ‘dangerous’ individuals, as well as 
‘suspicious’ acts. Notoriously, in the past, attempts to identify and isolate ‘dangerous’ 
persons have been plagued by high rates of false positives.73 However, in an age of big data 
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and machine learning, we might reasonably expect a continuing improvement in the accuracy 
of prediction. How might such a development relate to the Fullerian aspiration of generality? 
Briefly, where the classes of ‘dangerous’ and ‘non dangerous’ persons are quite broad, the 
application of technological management will be relatively general; and this would seem to 
satisfy the Fullerian standard. However, to the extent that there are significant numbers of 
false positives in the group classified as dangerous, this is an obvious cause for concern (even 
if, with sophisticated machine learning, the predictions improve). Conversely, where profiling 
becomes more fine-grained and the management is more personalised, the targeting of 
particular individuals will be more pronounced. Here, instead of focusing on dangerous acts 
or dangerous classes, precision profiling is likely to identify and isolate dangerous 
individuals. While accurate identification eases concerns about injustice, the strategy raises 
Fullerian concerns by becoming more ad hominem. 
There is also the thought that the real question raised by such a strategy is not whether the 
profiling is of individuals-as-members-of-certain classes or of individuals-as-individuals, but 
whether individuals are made aware of their profiles and predictions and given the 
opportunity to use them, so to speak, as mirrors that enable them ‘to change their ways and/or 
to contest a profile’s application.’74    
This, however, is to take us away from the question of generality. So far as generality is 
concerned, it seems quite possible that this will raise major question for communities using 
profiling techniques while committed to Fullerian principles. For, if this form of 
technological management offends a community’s ideas of fairness or legality but is more 
accurate than more general profiling and targeting strategies, some hard choices will need to 
be made. 
6.9 Taking stock 
In a context of technological management, I suggest that the best reading of Fuller is that the 
key principles of legality become openness, or transparency, in authorising the use of 
measures of technological management for particular regulatory purposes, supported by 
ideals of fairness and due process.75 So far as public regulators are concerned, there needs to 
be an authorising rule framework setting out the process for adopting measures of 
technological management, with particular proposed uses being openly debated (for example, 
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in the legislative assembly or by administrative notice and comment procedure). As Danielle 
Keats Citron, has recommended76:  
[A]gencies should explore ways to allow the public to participate in the building of 
automated decision systems…. 
In the same vein, agencies could establish information technology review boards that 
would provide opportunities for stakeholders and the public at large to comment on a 
system’s design and testing. Although finding the ideal makeup and duties of such 
boards would require some experimentation, they would secure opportunities for 
interested groups to comment on the construction of automated systems that would 
have an enormous impact on their communities once operational.   
Moreover, private use of technological management should be permitted only within publicly 
agreed limits (perhaps, for example, for the purpose of assessing commercial risk) and, if new 
uses are proposed, they should be approved by open special procedures (possibly akin to 
applications for planning permission). In all cases, ideals of fairness should support the 
process by insisting that tricks or traps should be avoided. 
Although technological management presents in a quite different way to rule-based laws, 
there is, I believe, a strong thread of connection to Fullerian ideals. Fuller, it will be recalled, 
traced his differences with his critics to the following two key assumptions made by the legal 
positivists: 
The first of these is a belief that the existence or non-existence of law is, from a moral 
point of view, a matter of indifference. The second is an assumption…that law should 
be viewed not as the product of an interplay of purposive orientations between the 
citizen and his government but as a one-way projection of authority, originating with 
government and imposing itself upon the citizen.77  
With regard to the first of these assumptions, I have already indicated that I view law as 
central to assisting communities with moral aspirations to resolve their differences; and, from 
a legal idealist perspective, it clearly matters that we have law in the sense of respect for the 
ideals of legality and the Rule of Law—this being the fundamental point for both Fuller (in 
the context of rules) and for this paper (in the context of technological management). As we 
will see in the next part of the paper, the question of whether it matters that we have not just 
law, but laws in the form of rules, raises some very interesting issues. Even if technological 
management is more effective than rules of law, there might still be reasons for maintaining 
some practices of standard-setting, norm negotiation, and the like.  
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Turning to the second of the key assumptions, Fuller elaborates the point by drawing a crucial 
contrast between a legal form of order and simple managerial direction.  He sketches the 
distinction between the two forms of order in the following terms: 
The directives issued in a managerial context are applied by the subordinate in order 
to serve a purpose set by his superior. The law-abiding citizen, on the other hand, does 
not apply legal rules to serve specific ends set by the lawgiver, but rather follows 
them in the conduct of his own affairs, the interests he is presumed to serve in 
following legal rules being those of society generally. The directives of a managerial 
system regulate primarily the relations between the subordinate and his superior and 
only collaterally the relations of the subordinate with third persons. The rules of the 
legal system, on the other hand, normally serve the primary purpose of setting the 
citizen’s relations with other citizens and only in a collateral manner his relations with 
the seat of authority from which the rules proceed. (Though we sometimes think of 
the criminal law as defining the citizen’s duties towards his government, its primary 
function is to provide a sound and stable framework for the interactions of citizens 
with one another).78 
As Fuller concedes, these remarks need ‘much expansion and qualification’;79 and he tries to 
give more substance to them by characterising the relationship, in a legal order, between 
government and citizens in terms of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘intendment’.80 Perhaps, Fuller’s most 
evocative observation is that ‘the functioning of a legal system depends upon a cooperative 
effort—an effective and responsible interaction—between lawgiver and subject.’81   
From this clutch of ideas, it is the association of legal ordering with an open and two-way 
reciprocal process that is most fruitful. For, in the larger context of the regulatory 
environment, it implies that the legal approach—an approach to be valued—is one that 
embeds participation, transparency, due process and the like in the construction and 
reconstruction of this environment. Hence, if we take our lead from Fuller, we will reason 
that, whether we are dealing with a regulatory enterprise that subjects human conduct to the 
governance of rules (in the way that both Fuller and his critics agreed was the pre-theoretical 
nature of law) or that relies on technological control to design-in or design-out conduct, we 
should hold on to the idea that what we value is a reciprocal enterprise, not just a case of 
management, let alone technological management, by some regulatory elite.  
7. Excluding the use of technological management 
Although the spirit of the Fullerian ideals of legality can be brought to bear on the adoption 
of technological management, we might still feel that, if not quite a fresh start, some 
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supplementation needs to be made. To be sure, the Fullerian ideals continue to be applicable 
to the normative dimensions of the regulatory environment; but, once technological 
management is employed, these ideals as specified might be thought no longer to apply in an 
entirely adequate way. As we have intimated on a number of occasions, even if it is a 
necessary condition for the legitimacy of a particular use of technological management that 
the underlying normative rule satisfies or would satisfy the Rule of Law, is this sufficient? 
Are there not additional conditions and considerations for the use of technological 
management which, after all, is unlike a rule in that it compels or ‘obliges’ regulatees to act 
in certain ways? Accordingly, our fourth question is this: if the use of technological 
management is not to be arbitrary, if its use is to be ‘respected’ by citizens, what additional 
terms and conditions should be set for its use? Let me suggest the following further 
conditions and considerations (each expressed in the form of a question) that merit serious 
consideration and that might be reasons for regulators to hesitate before employing 
technological management.  
7.1 Will the use of technological management compromise or diminish the essential 
conditions for moral community? 
For any community that has moral aspirations, it is imperative that technological 
management does not compromise the essential conditions for moral community. In other 
words, the Rule of Law should require that the use of technological management should be 
consistent with the maintenance of the essential conditions for moral community. Stated 
minimally, the moral aspiration is that all members of the community, whether regulators or 
regulatees, should try to do the right thing (relative to the legitimate interests of both 
themselves and others). While it is for each community to determine precisely how these 
essential conditions are articulated, interpreted, and operationalised, let me suggest that three 
key concerns relate to (i) maintaining the context for the possibility of authentic moral action, 
(ii) preserving the practical option of acting in accordance with one’s conscience, and (iii) 
preserving space for moral debate and development. 
With regard to authenticity, the point is that, even where regulatees accept the moral 
judgments made by regulators, there might be a concern that the use of technological 
management interferes with the cultivation of moral virtue, with an understanding of what it 
is to respect others and with authentic moral action. As I have emphasised on many other 
occasions, by compelling or precluding certain actions, technological management interferes 
with agents freely doing the right thing for the right reason.82   
Where regulatees do not accept the moral judgments made by regulators, the use of 
technological management might be in tension with their conscience in more than one way. 
In some scenarios, the use of technological management might compel an agent to do x, 
where the agent judges that doing x is either morally prohibited or that it is morally optional 
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(and the agent who is so compelled would not opt to do x); in other scenarios, the use of 
technological management might prevent an agent from doing y, where the agent judges that 
doing y is either morally required or that it is morally optional (and the agent who is so 
prevented would opt to do y). We can argue about whether these examples of compulsion and 
prevention are all equally moral problematic but, in the paradigmatic case of technological 
management being used to compel an agent to do an act that he or she judges to be morally 
prohibited, this is surely an extremely serious compromising of moral community. At least, in 
a normative order, there is a ‘gap’ between the rule and the agent’s act of compliance or non-
compliance; agents might have rule-based obligations but they are not obliged or compelled 
to follow the rule; typically, there is an opportunity for an agent to decline to act in a way that 
offends their conscience.  
Where the community is concerned to avoid compelling members to act against their 
conscience, then this suggests that regulators should eschew the use of technological 
management where there are significant moral disagreements about the regulatory purpose or 
provision. Moreover, quite apart from the potential tension between individual conscience 
and technologically managed compulsion or prevention, there is, as Evgeny Morozow has 
pointed out, a possible interference with the opportunities for civil disobedience and 
conscientious objection that we value in liberal democracies.83  
Then there is the concern about preserving sufficient space for moral debate and 
development, for the realisation of a community with an active and engaged moral 
membership, with members taking personal moral responsibility. How should we judge 
whether a particular employment of technological management will make any significant 
difference to the context that is presupposed by moral community? There is no reason to 
think that, in previous centuries, the fitting of locks on doors, or the installing of safes, and 
the like, has fatally compromised the conditions for moral community. Even allowing for the 
greater sophistication, variety, and density of technological management in the present 
century, will this make a material difference? Surely, it might be suggested, there still will be 
sufficient occasions left over for agents freely to do the right thing and to do it for the right 
reason as well as to oppose regulation that offends their conscience. In response to these 
questions, it will be for each community with moral aspirations to assess how precautionary it 
needs to be in its use of such a regulatory strategy.84  
As an example of precautionary thinking, regulators might draw back from using 
technological management where they sense that it is either doing too much work for 
regulatees or disrupting informal group or sectoral standard-setting and norm negotiation—
for example, the norms of ‘neighbourliness’ and of ‘cooperation and compromise’ that 
characterise the self-regulating groups that we meet, respectively, in Robert Ellickson’s 
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classic study of the ranchers and farmers of Shasta County, California,85 and in Stewart 
Macaulay’s seminal study of the transactional practices of Wisconsin business people.86 
Accordingly, before the use of technological management is authorised, it might be thought 
important to check on how this is likely to impact on the opportunities for groups to self-
regulate their interactions and transactions; and, to the extent that the law of torts and of 
contract reflects group standards rather than setting or imposing them, regulators might 
hesitate before using technological management lest it crowds out self-regulatory practices 
that make an important contribution to the moral life of the community.87  
7.2 Should the core parts of the criminal code be ring-fenced against technological 
management?  
Why should a community with moral aspirations wish to ring-fence some rule-based parts of 
its law against possibly more effective technological management? One thought is that the 
use of technological management might provoke some injustice in the treatment of offenders; 
but, if the technology prevents the commission of crime, there should be no offenders to be 
treated. A more convincing thought is that the technology might be broad sweep preventing 
not only the commission of offences but also innocent acts by innocent persons. Let me 
focus, however, on another angle which is that these core areas of the criminal law are places 
where some space needs to be given for the assumption of moral responsibility and moral 
development.  
If we turn the clock back, we find that from the middle part of the nineteenth century, there is 
the beginning of a bifurcation between, on the one hand, traditional criminal law, tort law, 
and contract law, and, on the other, a body of risk-managing regulatory law where liability 
can be absolute, strict, and impersonal. For example, we see a significant divergence 
between, so to speak, ‘true’ or ‘real’ crime (intentionally inflicting serious harm on another 
agent) and merely ‘regulatory’ crimes (where unsafe goods, practices, or conditions might 
lead to harm being caused);88 and in the case of torts, we see, as Geneviève Viney and Anne 
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Guégan-Lécuyer put it, a movement away from liability that is fault-based and that is 
‘conceived of as personal, individual and subjective.’89 In contracts, the bifurcation is more 
complex. Initially, classical ideas of ‘subjective’ agreement give way to notions of ‘objective’ 
agreement;90 but the fundamental bifurcation takes place only in the later part of the twentieth 
century when the law responds to the particular needs of the consumer marketplace—a 
marketplace that, in the present century, will increasingly be characterised by sophisticated 
technologies that structure and personalise the transaction in a way that tends to prioritise the 
commercial interests of suppliers.91  
Now, it is tempting to think that, to the extent that technological management can eliminate 
unsafe goods, practices, or conditions, then all well and good—indeed, this is a distinct 
improvement on relatively ineffective rules that try to promote human health and safety, 
‘green’ environmental practices, and the like. However, in a community that has moral 
aspirations, where the core provisions of the criminal code are viewed as expressing serious 
moral and public wrongs affecting all members of the community, this is an important space 
for both communication and condemnation. This gives rise to two cautionary thoughts: the 
first is that we should be slow to copy across the features of regulatory criminal law to the 
core criminal offences; and, the second is that we should be slow to abandon moral censure 
where we are dealing with serious public wrongs.  
Speaking to the first caveat, Francis Sayre famously argued that it would be a grave mistake 
simply to copy across the features of regulatory law to the core criminal offences. As Sayre 
put it: 
 The group of offenses punishable without proof of any criminal intent must be sharply 
limited. The sense of justice of the community will not tolerate the infliction of 
punishment which is substantial upon those innocent of intentional or negligent 
wrongdoing; and law in the last analysis must reflect the general community sense of 
justice.92 
However, this is not an argument against the use of technological management in place of 
either the regulatory or the core crimes; rather, Sayre is cautioning against the proliferation of 
absolute and strict liability offences. The purpose of technological management is not to ease 
the burden on prosecutors or claimants; it is quite different, seeking to preclude or exclude 
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the possibility of committing what would otherwise be crimes and torts. While it might seem 
unlikely that ‘the general community sense of justice’ would be outraged by the use of 
technological management in place of regulatory criminal offences (or torts), it is unclear 
whether the same would apply if it were proposed to rely on measures of technological 
management rather than penal rules in the core parts of the criminal code. 
With regard to the second caveat, Antony Duff makes the important point that regulators who 
are contemplating using a ‘non-criminal’ mode of regulation rather than the criminal law 
should hesitate before changing the regulatory signal from one that is moral to one that is 
prudential.93 Thus,  
We must ask about the terms in which the state should address its citizens when it 
seeks to regulate their conduct, and whether the tones of criminal law, speaking of 
wrongs that are to be condemned, are more appropriate than those of a regulatory 
regime that speaks only of rules and penalties for their breach.94 
According to Duff, where the conduct in question is a serious public wrong, it would be a 
‘subversion’ of the criminal law if offenders were not to be held to account and condemned. 
The unanswered question is whether using technological management to preclude or exclude 
conduct that would otherwise be condemned as a serious moral wrong would also amount to 
a subversion of the criminal law. Here, the complexion of the regulatory signal changes, not 
from moral to prudential, but from moral to non-normative possibility and impossibility.95 
For a moral community, even if serious breaches of moral rights and duties could be 
prevented by the use of technological management, it might be thought to be important to 
maintain this sphere of conduct as a rule-guided zone—because this is where there is a public 
accounting for our conduct, this is one of the ways in which moral agents come to appreciate 
the nature of their most important rights and responsibilities, and this is how in inter-personal 
dealings they develop their sense of what it is to do the right thing.96  
7.3 Will agents become over-reliant on technological management? 
Following on from the last point, regulators should perhaps be mindful that agents might 
come to assume that they no longer need be concerned about doing the right thing because 
the technology will manage matters for them. For example, some years ago, David Smith 
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raised the question of whether, if the architecture and technology of public transport systems 
makes it impossible to ride the trains without having purchased a ticket—or, as in the then 
planned Météor line in Paris, to ‘eliminate opportunities for suicide attempts…, the 
intentional pushing of riders [off platforms], and the deposit of narcotics on the tracks for 
later sale’97—this might weaken the sense of individual responsibility for paying the fare (or 
otherwise doing the right thing).98 Might publicly-transported regulatees become over-reliant 
on moral management by the technology? Or, to generalise this, we might wonder whether, if 
payment for provision of goods and services is automated so that it is not possible to avoid 
payment—for example, so that it is not possible to drive away from the petrol station without 
paying for the fuel, or to leave the supermarket without having paid for the goods—this might 
have some impact on the sense of obligation to honour one’s debts. If technological 
management threatens to take over in this way, regulators might have reason to take steps to 
restore regulatees’ sense of moral obligation and responsibility. 
7.4 Will technological management map accurately onto the moral interests recognised? 
Where the aspiration is not simply to be a moral community (a community committed to the 
primacy of moral reason) but a particular kind of moral community, then it will be a 
condition of the Rule of Law that the use of technological management should be consistent 
with its particular constitutive features. For example, where a community is guided by a 
deontological morality that operates with a set of basic moral rights and moral duties (such as 
respecting the person, property, and personality of others, telling the truth, keeping one’s 
promises, and so on), it will be important to consider whether the use of technological 
management is compatible with those particular rights and duties. Hence, in a Gewirthian 
community of rights, the use of technological management will be limited to measures and 
purposes that are compatible with respect for the generic rights of agents. Because 
Gewirthian moral theory recognises both negative and positive rights, its application to 
technological management might well be different from some other rights-led theories; but 
this is not a question that I can pursue further here.99  
Consider in this light a proposal to use technological management to protect the privacy 
interests of agents. Although critics of rule-based protection of privacy might argue that the 
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requirement of consent is less of a protection for the party whose privacy is at issue and more 
of a licence for prospective infringers, technological management will not map onto the 
community’s underlying understanding of the privacy right if it eliminates the possibility of 
consent. Particularly where the community is committed to a will theory of rights (as would 
be the case in a Gewirthian community of rights), it is integral to that view that the rights 
holder may authorise acts that would otherwise infringe the right; and eliminating this 
dynamic in the relationships between rights holders and others would be a defective 
translation of the community’s moral understanding. 
7.5 Where does technological management end and nudging begin? 
I have emphasised that this paper focuses on technological management: it is not about the 
regulatory use of technological instruments that fall short of forcing or compelling or 
excluding regulatees’ actions; it is not about defaults, or advisory technologies, or tilts, or 
nudges. It is about what is possible and what is impossible. To be sure, we might find that 
technological management is rarely used and that concerns about legality and the Rule of 
Law actually home in on less extreme forms of technological intervention. Nevertheless, this 
paper is about technological management and the conditions that might be set for its use by 
the Rule of Law and the ideal of legality. 
All this said, in practice, the distinction between technological management and nudges that 
are strong and sticky is a fine one; while, on paper, nudges reserve to agents the possibility of 
switching a default or opting out, in reality, the choice might be illusory. For most agents, the 
line between what is impossible and what is not realistically practicable might be irrelevant; 
either way, there is no real choice. Accordingly, we might suggest a rather different kind of 
regulatory hesitation, not so much a hesitation before using measures of technological 
management, but a hesitation when thinking about using measures the practical impact of 
which is likely to be little different to technological management.  
Suppose that, in a particular moral community, it is taken as axiomatic that competent agents 
should be left to make their own judgments about what is in their self-interest, at any rate 
relative to the kind of lifestyle they wish to lead, the kind of projects and plans that they 
choose to pursue. In such a community, any proposal to use either rules or technological 
management for the ‘purely paternalistic’100 protection of such agents should be rejected as 
incompatible with the community’s commitments.101 Suppose, though, the proposal is to set a 
particular default with a tilt that will ‘nudge’ citizens to act in ways that regulators judge to 
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be in their best interest (for example, by improving the general health and well-being of 
citizens). Should such a proposal be authorised? Because agents retain the option of ‘opting 
out’ and switching the default, it might well be agreed that the proposal is compatible with 
the community’s liberal commitments. However, if the default is particularly sticky, 
regulators might draw back on the ground that this is tantamount to technological 
management. Famously, Mill railed against coerced paternalism,102 and liberals today should 
object even more strongly to fully compelled and all-but-compelled paternalism. At least with 
coercive rules there is the practical option of non-compliance; with technological 
management there is no such option. For liberals, the wrong that Mill identified is 
compounded and intensified where technological management—or a nudge that is impossible 
in practice to avoid—is used for unjustified purely paternalistic reasons.103    
Putting this point more generally, where regulators have reasons to hesitate before employing 
a measure of technological management (reasons that distinctively relate to their proposed 
use of such a measure), they should hesitate to set aside those reasons simply because the 
measure that they are proposing to use is not strictly speaking one of technological 
management. If regulators are uncertain about whether their proposed measure might actually 
function in the same way as a measure of technological management they should exercise 
precaution. In other words, they should proceed with their proposal in just the way that they 
would proceed were it a measure of technological management. 
7.6 Is the proposed measure of technological management being applied to protect the 
essential infrastructure for human agency? 
In some previous papers,104 I have suggested that we might entrust the preservation and 
improvement of the essential infrastructural conditions for human agency to regulatory 
stewards who, for that purpose, might be authorised to use technological management. How 
might this square with the requirements of the Rule of Law?  Certainly, there is no suggestion 
in my remarks that we should confer a blank technocratic cheque on regulators, treating them 
as mandated to act in whatever way they judge to be in the prudential interests of the 
community. Human agents have compelling reasons, both prudential and moral, for 
protecting the existence conditions for human life and the generic conditions for agency; but 
the Rule of Law would underline that the jurisdiction of the regulatory stewards (and, 
concomitantly, whatever use they make of technological management) is strictly limited to 
maintaining the essential infrastructural conditions. Moreover, anticipating ongoing debates 
about where precisely the boundary lies between these conditions and the activities of agents 
who are supported by this infrastructure—for example, it might be argued that some of the 
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core criminal offences are part of this infrastructure—the community might insist that the 
regulatory stewards deploy technological management only when they are comfortably intra 
vires. 
It remains only to say that, unlike the Fullerian principles of legality, which focus on formal 
and procedural desiderata, these conditions and considerations for the lawful use of 
technological management bring into play a thicker morally substantive set of requirements. 
To claim that the Fullerian principles were only about effective regulation was never 
convincing; once they are set in the context of legal ordering, the principles are clearly about 
fairness. To claim that the Rule of Law conditions for the use of technological management 
are simply about effectiveness is manifestly absurd. Technological management appeals 
because it promises to be more effective than rules; but its brute instrumentalism demands 
that its use is conditioned by principles that give it legitimacy—otherwise, there is no reason 
why regulatees should at least acquiesce in its use.   
8. Conclusion 
According to Mireille Hildebrandt, the ‘challenge facing modern law is to reinvent itself in an 
environment of pre-emptive computing without giving up on the core achievements of the 
Rule of Law’.105 If we do not rise to this challenge, Hildebrandt leaves her readers in no 
doubt about the seriousness of the consequences: 
If we do not learn how to uphold and extend the legality that protects individual 
persons against arbitrary or unfair state interventions, the law will lose its hold on our 
imagination. It may fold back into a tool to train, discipline or influence people whose 
behaviours are measured and calculated to be nudged into compliance, or, the law will 
be replaced by techno-regulation, whether or not that is labelled as law.106 
In other words, it is the ideal of legality together with the Rule of Law that stands between us 
and a disempowering techno-managed future. The question is, though, how we should 
articulate and apply these protective ideals. That, as I have said, has been the central question 
for this paper.  
The compact that underlies the Rule of Law is the fulcrum of normative legal orders. It 
constrains against arbitrary governance and, where governance satisfies the relevant 
conditions, it demands responsible citizenship (paradigmatically in calling for respect for the 
law). With the introduction of technological management, the compact needs to be updated 
and its emphasis modified but its spirit persists and its importance is greater than ever. In a 
context of technological management, those laws that authorise the use of technological 
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management must be promulgated and their administration needs to be congruent with the 
terms of the authorisation. However, the key point is that there needs to be systematic 
openness about the proposed use of technological management. Regulatees need to be part of 
the process of setting the general terms and conditions for the use of technological 
management as well as for the adoption of particular measures of technological management; 
and there must be an ongoing transparency about the use of these instruments and about how 
the particular technologies work. 
In relation to the four questions that structured my discussion, my principal conclusions are 
as follows. First, rules are as much instrumentalist as technological management in the 
reasoning that shapes their use; no one suggests that rules are necessarily in tension with the 
ideal of the Rule of Law; and no one should suppose that technological management is 
necessarily in tension with the ideal of the Rule of Law. Instrumentalist regulatory reasoning 
is not, in itself, a problem. Secondly, it is possible to reverse engineer the use of technological 
management so that either the underlying rule or policy assumed by the regulator or the 
underlying rule or policy that fits with the technology as implemented is exposed. If the 
underlying rule or policy (whether as intended or simply as reverse engineered) would violate 
the Rule of Law (on any reasonable interpretation), then it follows that the particular use of 
technological management is also incompatible with the Rule of Law. If, however, the 
underlying rule or policy would not violate the Rule of Law, this is not quite the end of the 
matter: the use of technological management might raise distinct concerns; and, while it is 
certainly a necessary condition for the acceptability of a particular use of technological 
management that the underlying rule or policy is compatible with the Rule of Law, it might 
not be sufficient. Thirdly, although the Fullerian principles of legality are focused on the use 
of rules as the regulatory instrument, the spirit of promulgation, of transparency, and of fair 
dealing that underlies Fuller’s specification of his principles can be copied across to the use 
of technological management. In other words, the Fullerian principles demand that proposals 
for the use of technological management are promulgated with a view to facilitating public 
debate of both the underlying regulatory purpose and the particular technological fix to be 
applied; and, irrespective of whether the instrument of regulation is a rule or a technological 
fix, Fullerian principles condemn regulatory practices that are prone to trick or to trap 
regulatees. Fourthly, a community with moral aspirations might want to specify in their 
version of the Rule of Law that technological management should not be used (i) where, in a 
context of reasonable moral disagreement, it might put some regulatees in a position of being 
compelled to act against their conscience or (ii) where there is a danger that it will crowd out 
the space that regulatees need to debate and discuss what it is to do the right thing and duly to 
develop an independent moral judgment.  Beyond that, moral communities will require the 
use of technological management to cohere with their particular fundamental values and 
commitments. That said, whatever the community’s aspirations, and whatever their moral 
differences, it has to be understood that no kind of community is feasible unless the 
infrastructural conditions for human life and agency are secured. To this extent, there is a 
case for agreeing, within the Rule of Law compact, a special stewardship jurisdiction that 
includes authorisation for regulators to use measures of technological management in order to 
protect and promote these essential conditions.  
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Finally, the tentative nature of the sketch presented in this paper should be emphasised. My 
first thought about the relationship between, on the one hand, technological management and, 
on the other, the ideals of legality and the Rule of Law was that it would be futile—indeed, 
nonsensical—to attempt to apply principles drafted for a normative regulatory enterprise to a 
quite different non-normative regulatory environment. Certainly, there cannot be a literal or 
mechanical application. However, I now think that I underestimated how far the spirit of the 
Fullerian principles carries across to technological management and, in my concern to 
emphasise the radically different non-normative signals associated with technological 
management, I  underestimated the significance of the underlying normative view. That said, 
this is very much work in progress and the only points about which I am really confident are 
that the ideals of legality and the Rule of Law matter as much as ever where regulators turn to 
technological management and that lawyers should be in the vanguard in working out how 
these historic ideals apply to a world where, as Will Hutton has put it, technology changes 
everything107—including, I would add, changing the nature of regulation itself.   
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